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Rating Tax Reform 
on Growth
Joseph J. Minarik 
The Urban Institute
Let me begin this lecture with a hypothetical question: 
suppose that you were confronted with two alternative lottery 
tickets, one with relatively attractive odds of a small prize and 
the other with longer odds but a larger prize.
How would you evaluate the alternatives? What would 
influence you in making your choice?
Would you place a bet only if your preferred alternative 
were made available, or would you take a chance either way?
I raise these questions because they are much like the 
choices among alternative investments that many businesses 
must make. Further, the tax system can make business choices 
more like either the high-percentage, low-stakes bet or the 
low-percentage, high-stakes bet.
Of course, the most fundamental elements of the tax system 
are very much on the bargaining table right now, in a process 
that has come to be known as tax reform. This process is 
highly controversial, with conflicting claims of paradise and 
inferno as the likely result. Nowhere have the claims and 
counterclaims been more frequent and more strident than in 
the field of business taxation. Some business spokesmen have 
seen tax reform as a step toward a more efficient and neutral 
allocation of investment capital among sectors, leading to 
faster growth and greater productivity. Advocates of other 
firms, however, have been particularly adamant that tax 
reform will choke off investment and lead to stagnation.
Which side is right? Is either side right?
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Even in this environment of uncertainty, we can say some 
things about what a sound tax policy would be, guided by 
basic principles and by recent economic history. The stakes 
are high, and so this inquiry is well worth the effort.
I will begin this lecture by setting the scene for the tax 
reform debate with the tax cuts of 1981. We will see that this 
law's attempts to stimulate growth caused much of the 
impetus for tax reform today. We will also see how today's 
proposals for reform of the individual income tax largely 
determine the outlines of proposals for business tax reform, 
and that these outlines lead to much of the opposition on 
grounds of investment and growth. Finally, we will examine 
the track record of the current law on investment, and 
consider the prospects for investment under distinctly dif 
ferent tax rules.
Tax Reform Yesterday
Several years ago, an imaginative pundit wrote a mostly 
(but not totally) tongue-in-cheek piece called "The Ten Com 
mandments of Tax Reform." Commandment number one (as 
I recall) was a dictum apparently well known to policymakers, 
instinctively if not consciously: "Whatever you want to do, 
call it'reform.'"*
On this basis, it is not surprising that we have had a lot of 
tax "reform" in recent years.
It is not a huge logical leap from the nearly universal cries 
that our tax system today is in desperate need of "reform" to
*(I confess that, with the best of intentions and calling upon the most knowledgeable people 
in the field, I cannot document this article that is so vividly etched upon my memory. Perhaps 
someone who hears or reads this lecture will be able to help me along. Or in the best of all 
possible outcomes, perhaps I only imagined it. Then I would have only nine commandments 
to go, and I could write the article myself)
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a realization that the many recent "reforms" somehow missed 
their mark. The proof of this idea is no farther away than the 
last major piece of tax "reform" legislation, and indeed the 
root of our current budgetary crisis: the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981, commonly identified by its acronym of 
ERTA.
ERTA was motivated, for the most part, by two strongly 
held beliefs of its early champions: that the level of individual 
marginal income tax rates was so high as to deter work and 
saving; and that the tax treatment of business investments in 
depreciable capital, the carriers of technological progress and 
the instruments of growth, was so rigorous as to choke off 
such investments. Obviously, with an agenda such as that, tax 
reform was quite simple; cutting individual income tax rates is 
intellectually trivial, and accelerating business growth can be 
(and was) done in simple ways.
Of course, the political salvation of ERTA was that it did 
not hurt anyone (with very few exceptions, to be discussed 
later). ERTA was the tax equivalent of throwing money at 
problems roughly $747 billion over five years, to be specific. 
Roughly two-thirds of this tax cut went to individuals, and 
about one-third to corporations. With an uplifting theme like 
"reform," and all that money to go around, who could be 
opposed?
The problem, as we now see so clearly, is that ERTA both 
gave away money that we as a nation did not have, and that 
it did so in an inconsistent manner. On the question of raw 
dollars, ERTA opened a budget chasm that was to be filled 
with future unspecified budget cuts. The nation took the cash 
with a smile, and only recoiled when the spending-cut bills 
came due. Without the spending cuts that a now-informed 
nation refuses to make, the tax cuts are unjustifiable.
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Equally troublesome for tax policy, however, are the inter 
nal inconsistencies that ERTA created. Though allegedly 
evenhanded because of equal percentage tax rate cuts across 
the board, ERTA in fact shortchanged the poor and near- 
poor. The percentage tax rate cut did little for millions of 
low-income persons whose personal exemptions and zero 
bracket amounts, badly eroded by five years of rapid inflation, 
were left to continue to erode over five more years.
A further and more structural inconsistency of the post- 
1981 tax law was demonstrated by the enactment and heavy 
use of safe-harbor tax leasing. ERTA, in its zeal to encourage 
business investment in depreciable capital, including the Ac 
celerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS). ACRS made tax 
depreciation extraordinarily generous so generous, in fact, 
that many firms found that the early-year deductions, in 
combination with the investment tax credit (ITC), completely 
wiped out their tax liabilities, with still more deductions left 
over. These deductions were temporarily wasted unless the 
investing firm had income from other sources against which 
the deductions could be offset. This gave an important 
advantage to large, highly profitable firms, who could use all 
of the their tax advantages from depreciation; smaller firms, 
especially new firms with little or no taxable income, would 
have to raise more cash to undertake investments (because 
they could not enjoy an immediate tax reduction from depre 
ciation and the ITC), and so such firms might choose to 
postpone investments until they could use the tax breaks.
The Reagan administration foresaw this problem, and 
chose to remedy it by allowing safe-harbor leases paper 
transactions through which firms that could not use their full 
depreciation deductions and ITCs could sell their assets to 
more profitable firms that could use the tax benefits. The 
public outcry that followed the "buying and selling of tax 
breaks," however, with the spectacle of banks, insurance
35
companies, and General Electric claiming deductions and 
credits for other firms' investments and paying no income tax 
on billions of dollars of profits, caused the Congress to 
promptly reverse its field and repeal the leasing law. Congress 
did not, of course, repeal the ACRS and ITC provisions that 
motivated safe-harbor leasing; so while the symptom has been 
cured, the disease remains. New symptoms have appeared, 
including mergers involving firms with unused reservoirs of 
tax deductions and credits.
Both the internal inconsistencies and the revenue inadequa 
cies of the post-1981 tax law have motivated the current drive 
for tax reform. The role of the internal inconsistencies is 
obvious; the President and all other tax reform advocates cite 
the need for tax relief for the poor and an end to over- 
generous depreciation. (In the case of the President, of course, 
this is quite an about-face from four years ago.) The revenue 
motivation for tax reform is perhaps less obvious, however; 
the President insists that any tax reform be revenue neutral, 
and all other reform proposals claim to follow that line 
(though some fall short). Nonetheless, many advocates of 
these proposals acknowledge that a tax increase to narrow the 
deficit is inevitable. The motivation for reform is that the 
current tax law, laden as it is with internal inconsistencies, 
could not provide substantial additional revenues without 
harmful side effects. If the President stands in the way of a tax 
increase but would welcome tax reform, it would be wise to 
get the first half of the job out of the way. Then when the need 
for revenue becomes even more apparent, possibly in a crisis, 
the necessary revenue tool will be ready.
Tax Reform Today
The new tax reform proposals are different from the 1981 
model in that they cannot give any money away. They are
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further different in that they address the issue that was the 
heart of the tax reform debate for decades before the 1981 
distraction: the definition of the tax base. In response to 
complaints from the household sector that the income tax is 
unfair, the President and others propose to repeal numerous 
deductions, exclusions, and credits from the tax law, reducing 
tax rates in compensation. Of course, with no money to give 
away and major changes in the law, it follows immediately 
that some taxpayers will win in the process, but others will 
lose. Nevertheless, by transferring revenues from the corpo 
rate sector to finance a household sector tax cut, the President 
can promise most households tax relief when the dust finally 
settles.
This kind of tax reform is acceptable to just about everyone 
(except those who lose deductions, exclusions, or credits that 
are particularly close to their hearts and wallets). In fact, tax 
reform is remarkable in uniting the tax field's "old fogies" and 
the "young turks." Old line tax reformers, of course, would 
like nothing more than a broader individual income tax base 
with lower rates. And even the supply-siders, if they really 
mean what they say about the primary importance of reducing 
marginal tax rates, have to agree with the wisdom of such tax 
reform. For them, a tax cut in dollar terms is not a necessary 
condition for supply-side economics to work. (In fact, from a 
more conventional point of view, supply-side economics could 
be successful if the tax base were broadened to recoup the 
revenue loss, and so no money were given away. In that case, 
the lower tax rates could encourage more work and saving, 
without a cash windfall to encourage leisure and spending.) So 
individual income tax reform a la Reagan 1985 has become 
part of the conventional wisdom of economic policymaking, 
even if it is not every interest group's cup of tea.
Business tax reform proposals follow right along with the 
individual version. Many of the individual income tax prefer-
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ences that cause the most unfairness and manipulative tax 
sheltering ACRS, the ITC, accelerated and exaggerated 
writeoffs for oil and gas drilling, accounting abuses also are 
used in the corporate sector. If they are repealed for house 
holds, then they must be repealed for corporations too. Just as 
marginal tax rates are reduced for households in compensa 
tion for the revenue gains from base broadening, so they are 
reduced for corporations. After all, the corporate income tax 
is really just a proxy tax on income that is temporarily held 
outside of the household sector; we tax corporations because, 
if we did not, households could set up corporations to hold 
and invest their money and therefore act as tax shelters. The 
reduction of corporate marginal tax rates keeps the top 
corporate rate roughly in line with the top individual rate, so 
that the proxy tax does not encourage the organization of 
businesses in either incorporated or unincorporated forms.
Thus, the conventional wisdom on individual income tax 
reform dictates the nature of tax reform on the corporate side; 
and because it is both conventional and wisdom, with agree 
ment from many ideological adversaries, everything must be 
hunky dory.
Mustn't it?
Lately there have been two distinct challenges to the 
corporate branch of tax reform as now preached and prac 
ticed. One challenge comes from within the traditional tax 
reform ranks and some other mainstream economists. This 
group argues that low-rate, low-subsidy corporate tax reform 
fails to make a proper distinction between old and new 
investments in plant and equipment. The argument goes like 
this: Corporations invested in depreciable capital in the past 
assuming that they would pay tax on any net income at 46 
percent (the highest corporate rate, at which most corporate 
income is taxed). Under tax reform, however, that tax rate
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would be cut to anywhere from 30 to 35 percent. That tax cut, 
the argument goes, is a pure windfall for investment that is 
already made, so that much of the revenue lost through the 
rate cut is wasted. The merit of the investment tax credit and 
accelerated depreciation, the story continues, is that they 
benefit only new investment. The high corporate tax rate that 
goes along with these subsidies (of necessity, to make up the 
revenues loss) then soaks up much of any abnormally high 
profits (or "rents") of old investments, without discouraging 
new investment. So this challenge is based on arguments of 
both economic and cost efficiency. (This argument underlies 
the Reagan administration's proposed "windfall recapture 
tax" on the benefits of past accelerated depreciation.) An 
extension of this argument is that a high corporate tax rate, 
falling as it most likely does on owners of capital, helps to 
make the overall tax system more progressive.
The other challenge comes not so much from economists as 
from the business sector. Some (but by no means all) business 
leaders argue that any diminution of incentives to invest, 
either through increases in the corporate tax burden (which 
the Reagan administration proposes to fund individual in 
come tax cuts) or through cutbacks of targeted investment 
subsidies, pushes in the wrong direction. The nation needs 
more investment, this argument goes, because a shortage of 
investment has been the culprit in our recent economic 
sluggishness. More investment would increase productivity, 
because investment is what brings the latest technology into 
the production process. From this point of view, tax reform's 
emphasis on the efficient allocation of investment, rather than 
on the raw amount of investment, is misplaced; we could end 
up with a better allocation of less capital, and be worse off 
when the dust settles.
Of course, this business argument is far from universally 
held; and keeping in mind business' tendency to look at the
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bottom line, this is not surprising. Remember that under a 
revenue-neutral business tax reform, some corporations 
would pay less tax, and some corporations would pay more. 
Because every business executive probably has a very keen 
sense of his firm's contribution to society, those executives 
whose firms would lose cash flow naturally have had negative 
things to say. Likewise, of course, leaders of firms that would 
win from tax reform (including primarily those firms most 
heavily taxed under the current law) have come forward 
aggressively to favor reform. This is another respect in which 
1985 differs most vividly from 1981; four years ago, businesses 
marched in lockstep for the huge tax cut represented by 
ACRS; today, because there would be losers as well as 
winners, the ranks are highly fractionated.
Consequently, economists and business leaders are divided 
on business tax reform, with the ultimate emphasis on growth. 
Some policy analysts and businessmen say that tax reform 
would make our nation leaner and tougher; others counter 
that business would be smaller and weaker. In the corporate 
sector, this division is easily explained by self-interest; but 
similar disagreements among economists prevent us from 
assuming that the only issue is whose oxen are gored. If we 
want to make the best possible judgment, we must go beyond 
the politics of the issue and analyze the economics.
Taking Stock
So what are the merits of these arguments? Will tax reform 
encourage or inhibit growth? To approach an answer, we 
must use economic theory, our recent experience, and (be 
cause we are contemplating new policy tools) some new 
thinking. We should certainly start by examining the link 
between tax policy and investment, but before we finish, we 
must also reconsider the often-assumed link between invest 
ment and growth.
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Theory. Unfortunately, as even the most avid theorists and 
econometricians would admit, our understanding of what 
causes investment is fuzzy at best. Two theories probably hold 
the most currency: the cost of capital theory and the acceler 
ator theory.
The cost of capital theory relies on neoclassical economics, 
putting a heavy emphasis on the supplies of factors of 
production, and less on the levels of aggregate demand needed 
to assure that those factors of production are fully employed. 
The cost of capital model focuses on how much it costs in 
interest, depreciation, and taxes, among other expenses to 
use a given quantity of capital for a given length of time. 
Because an equity investor in a unit of capital will want some 
positive return to justify his investment, there will most likely 
be some tax liability as part of the cost of capital. This tax 
liability increases the before-tax return needed to provide the 
investor with the minimum acceptable after-tax return (the 
least return that would induce the investor to make the 
investment). Thus, an increase in taxes on investment would 
make some previously acceptable investments unacceptable; it 
would raise the cost of capital for the marginal investment.
The accelerator theory, in contrast, looks more closely at 
the state of aggregate demand, and less closely at the supply of 
factors of production. It holds that investment is induced by 
increases in consumer demand which push on productive 
capacity, rather than by tax cuts for investment per se. From 
the point of view of the accelerator theory, a tax cut for 
investment income while businesses by and large have excess 
capacity would be wasted; it would be "pushing on a string," 
to invoke a common analogy. The revenue loss would go 
largely to businesses that would be investing anyway.
As was suggested not too long ago, neither of these two 
theories can claim an extreme of predictive accuracy. Empir-
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ical studies suggest that business behavior depends on many 
factors, surely including businessmen's varying perceptions of 
the conditions in their own varied markets. This diversity of 
view surely has much to do with the failure of any theoretical 
model to explain actual behavior.
Of the two models, though, it is the cost of capital model 
that is the more pertinent to the criticisms of tax reform 
related above. Economists would argue that incentives should 
be targeted to new investments, and businessmen would 
emphasize the level of business taxes, whether through incen 
tives or not. The kind of demand-push fiscal stimulus envi 
sioned in the accelerator model seems to be out of the question 
at the moment; our demand seems to have been pushed about 
as far as it would go in 1981.
The Record. It is here that recent history can lend a hand. 
Surely the 1981 tax law was the quintessential reduction in the 
tax component of the cost of capital; it cut business taxes 
significantly through a substantial acceleration of deprecia 
tion, targeted on new investment. In fact, its reduction in the 
tax component of the cost of capital was so great that in many 
instances, it made that tax component negative. That is, it 
gave such accelerated deductions for depreciation, coupled 
with the pre-existing investment tax credit, that the tax 
deductions and credits wiped out the tax liability of the typical 
investment in its early years, with more tax benefits left over. 
If the investor had income from other sources against which 
he could claim the deductions and credits, those tax savings 
exceeded (in present value terms) the tax on the investment in 
question in its later years, after the deductions and credits 
were used up. Taking into account the tax savings on other 
income and the time value of money, ACRS and the ITC were 
so generous as to make many typical investments into tax 
shelters. If that wouldn't stimulate investment, what would?
42
But did it stimulate investment? Here opinions differ. Some 
business advocates argue that the recovery of investment from 
the 1981-82 recession has been remarkable, and they seem to 
have the numbers on their side. Business investments in 
nonresidential structures and in equipment have grown more 
rapidly after this recession than they have in the typical 
previous post-World War II recovery. Advocates of generous 
tax treatment of investment assign this growth to the 1981 tax 
cuts.
A critical look at the numbers, however, leads to a far 
different outcome. The most important issue is just where this 
apparent boom in investment has gone. Barry Bosworth has 
shown that the increase in investment in equipment is highly 
concentrated in two types of assets: computers and business 
automobiles. It happens that the one area where ACRS was 
not generous was in its treatment of computers, which in fact 
fell between the cracks and were made subject to longer, not 
shorter, depreciable lives. The stimulus to investment in 
computers seems to have come from another direction: their 
falling prices. This episode just serves as a reminder that tax 
policy is by no means all of economics, and should not be the 
first resort for action on any problem that happens along. The 
boom in investment in business automobiles has an equally 
ideosyncratic explanation; consumers have become more in 
terested in automobile leasing as an alternative to purchase, 
and a leased automobile, even if used purely for personal 
purposes, is considered an investment by the leasing firm  
hence the jump in the investment figures.
When he omits computers and business automobiles from 
the investment statistics, Bosworth finds that the investment 
recovery from the 1981-82 recession looks much more typical 
from an historical perspective. In fact, when he measures the
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investment recovery relative to the previous business cycle 
peak, rather than the low point of the recession (which in 
1981-82 was extraordinarily low), Bosworth finds that the 
investment recovery has been below average (Barry P. Bos- 
worth, "Taxes and the Investment Recovery," Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 1:1985, pp. 1-38).
A further qualification of the strength of the investment 
recovery comes from an examination of investment in types of 
structures. Investment in industrial structures factories has 
been virtually flat since 1980. The growth of investment in 
nonresidential structures has been confined to commercial 
structures such as shopping centers and office buildings. 
Most analysts, certainly including many business advocates, 
would admit that investment in commercial structures was not 
a goal of the 1981 tax law, and has little potential impact on 
U.S. growth and competitiveness.
It is my conclusion from the data as described above that 
the extreme attempt at investment stimulus through tax policy 
undertaken in 1981 has failed, thus far, to produce demon 
strable results. This is especially true in light of the reinforcing 
of the "cost of capital" tax cut strategy with an "accelerator" 
tax cut promising a rush of consumer demand and encourag 
ing firms to build up their productive capacity.
There is certainly an argument that insufficient time has 
passed to pronounce judgment on the 1981 tax law, and that 
circumstances since 1981 have been extraordinary and have 
not allowed a fair test. One point worth considering, however 
is that the 1981 tax cuts may well have helped to create those 
extraordinary circumstances. Massive tax cuts, even on the 
order of ACRS taken alone, will increase the federal govern 
ment deficit and drive up interest rates. This is especially true 
because tax inducements to investment invariably are enjoyed 
by those who would have invested without the incentives, as
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well as the few who are affected at the margin. If the monetary 
authorities should fear an inflationary burst of excess demand 
and restrain the growth of the money supply, that will increase 
interest rates further. Because interest expense is an element of 
the cost of capital again, investment is determined by more 
than taxes alone an extreme strategy of investment subsidy 
through tax cuts can boomerang.
While we do not now have ironclad proof, the track record 
of tax subsidies for investment appears less than promising. In 
my judgment, we might well regard advocates of further 
investment subsidies in the tax code as 19th century physicians 
leaving a comatose patient to get more leeches.
The Issues
Why have tax incentives for investment had so little effect? 
In my opinion, despite its logical underpinnings, the cost-of- 
capital theory has some significant weaknesses as a guide to 
policy, especially when taken to extremes. I would like to 
discuss four areas in which I believe this is true.
New, Risky, and Recent-Loss Firms. To encourage invest 
ment under the cost-of-capital approach, taxes must be cut on 
the marginal investment. Significant tax cuts on investments 
earning only a minimum acceptable rate of return can take on 
strange forms, however. To stimulate investment in this way, 
ERTA resorted to such enormous accelerations of deprecia 
tion allowances that the tax on many marginal investments 
became negative. As was explained earlier, investors receive 
more deductions and credits than they need to wipe out all tax 
on the income generated by an investment early in its life. The 
excess deductions and credits can be used to offset tax on the 
investor's other income.
A problem arises if the investor does not have any other 
taxable income. In that case, the excess deductions just sit on
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the firm's accountant's shelf, depreciating with the passage of 
inflation. A firm in this situation has to raise more money in 
the credit markets to undertake an additional investment, 
because it does not have any reserves against taxes to draw 
down in anticipation of the value of the resulting tax prefer 
ences. Such a firm may postpone investments until a later 
date, when it expects to become profitable; or it may become 
prey for a takeover by some other firm that does have taxable 
income. (As was noted earlier, the 1981 tax law included 
safe-harbor leasing as a safety valve for just such situations, 
but the public found the results of tax leasing too offensive.)
These problems befall particular kinds of firms: new firms, 
which typically make large start-up investments and do not 
earn profits for several years; firms that have recently been 
unprofitable and are attempting to turn their situations 
around; and technologically advanced (colloquially, "high 
tech") firms, which make large investments with long gesta 
tion periods and uncertain chances of success. For these firms 
and for any others that cannot use their investment subsidies 
immediately, the tax benefits are significantly less valuable; 
consequently, some portion of the business population is left 
out of the investment subsidy strategy and disadvantaged by 
it. This could well make our investment performance under a 
cost of capital strategy less favorable than we might expect. 
Furthermore, it is far from clear that it is in our economic 
interest to favor large, established firms in traditional lines of 
business.
Tax Shelters. As was noted earlier, even a traditional 
investment can receive a negative effective tax rate under 
ACRS. It should not be surprising, then, that tax shelter 
brokers can achieve new heights of manipulation under the 
current law. In 1981, for the first time in a quarter century of 
compiled statistics, the entire partnership sector of the econ-
46
omy (partnerships are the preferred vehicles for tax shelters) 
showed an aggregate net loss, so great was the boom in tax 
sheltering. In 1982, this dubious distinction was repeated. The 
availability of ACRS depreciation deductions effective Janu 
ary 1, 1981, was an important cause of this development. Tax 
shelters cost the federal government revenue, and they waste 
capital as well; without the benefits of tax sheltering, there is 
no doubt that less of the U.S. capital stock would be allocated 
into investments in the oil and gas industry, and in residential 
and commercial real estate.
The use of real estate as a tax shelter causes another serious 
problem of resource misallocation. Commercial and residen 
tial real estate makes an effective tax shelter because it is easily 
resaleable (apartment and office buildings make safe and 
liquid investments because they almost always have many 
alternative users), and so it can be highly leveraged. That way, 
small amounts of cash can generate large amounts of depre 
ciation deductions. In contrast, factories have fewer alterna 
tive users, and so they are riskier investments, and less 
amenable to debt finance. If commercial and industrial struc 
tures received depreciation treatment equally generous to that 
of equipment, this tax sheltering would get completely out of 
hand. To prevent this, depreciation for shelters is made less 
generous than that for equipment (measured by the actual 
reduction in value, i.e., economic depreciation, over time). But 
this less generous depreciation treatment of structures carries 
over to disadvantage investments in factories, as opposed to 
shopping centers and office buildings. The tax bias away from 
industrial structures can only hinder growth over the long run 
by encouraging investments in modern equipment to be 
placed in outmoded structures. It is an inevitable outgrowth of 
an unbalanced policy with extreme incentives for investments 
in equipment.
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Double Taxation of Corporate Income. Another aspect of 
the investment incentive strategy is its effect on the double 
taxation of corporate source income. As was noted earlier, the 
rich investment incentives in the current law cost revenue, and 
so for any given revenue target, statutory tax rates must be 
higher. (Because the same generous depreciation must be 
made available to individual as to corporate investors, this 
strategy increases individual tax rates as well as corporate tax 
rates.) These higher tax rates increase the double tax on corpo 
rate source income at the margin, that is, on an additional dollar 
of fully taxable corporate income that is then distributed.
Sensitivity to Inflation. Another source of distortions be 
cause of the high tax rates required to finance large investment 
incentives is the interaction of the income tax and inflation. 
With higher tax rates, the mismeasurement of income and of 
interest expense due to inflation is more serious. (Further, 
ACRS itself is highly sensitive to inflation; at the low inflation 
rates that we currently enjoy, ACRS is an even greater net 
subsidy to investment than was anticipated at its enactment 
during the high inflation of 1981.)
Summary. A frequently heard argument for investment 
subsidies is that they encourage risk taking and innovation. As 
the foregoing analysis suggests, however, this is true in only a 
limited sense. Rich tax subsidies like ACRS encourage a risk 
taking and innovation, but mostly by large, established firms; 
newcomers and revitalized firms get less of a tax advantage. 
Further, if the incentive to innovate is a function of the 
after-tax income that the innovation will yield, and if the tax 
rate is close to 50 percent for either an individual or a 
corporation, that incentive has to be blunted. A firm or an 
individual with a new idea has to think twice about the 
relationship of after-tax reward to risk. What our current tax 
code seems to foster more than anything, in fact, is ultra-safe 
investments like real estate.
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It was with this tenor of the current tax code in mind that 
I raised my opening question about a low-risk, low-return 
lottery compared to a high-risk, high-return one. The current 
tax law, for all its stated intentions about innovation, seems 
more directed toward stand-pat investments. Business lobby 
ists may well argue that the world will end if our rich 
investment incentives are cut back or repealed. We should not 
be surprised by this; after all, that is what business lobbyists 
are (well) paid to do. Business executives, if they do what they 
are (well) paid to do, will seek out investments where there is 
profit to be made; and that task will not be changed by the 
repeal of tax subsidies for investment.
We can only wonder how our economy would perform if 
the tax code were purged of opportunities for low-risk, 
tax-shelter arbitrage, and were left with only a substantial 
reward for truly productive activity. There are some thoughts, 
however, that might give some idea of the potential benefits of 
tax reform.
Tax Reform Tomorrow
There is reason to believe that many of the allegations of tax 
reform harming investment are either unimportant or inaccu 
rate. There are other reasons why tax reform could in fact 
create a better climate for investment than many observers 
would anticipate. And there is further reason to expect that in 
tax reform as currently contemplated, getting there will be half 
the fun.
Investment and Growth. One possible criticism of tax reform 
from the cost-of-capital view of the world would be the likely 
increase in the tax burden on the marginal investment. With 
ACRS extending negative tax rates to many investments, 
there is no question that the current law reduces the required 
rate of return for investment. Tax reform, by repealing these
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net subsidies, would raise the required rate of return. Is this a 
serious disadvantage of tax reform? What would its effect be?
From a real world perspective, it is difficult to evaluate just 
how important it is to drive down the required rate of return 
to the extent that ACRS does. There is no telling just how 
often a firm contemplates an investment that it truly believes 
to be marginal. Some investments wind up earning barely a 
required rate of return; indeed, some wind up earning only 
losses. But it is unlikely that those investments were under 
taken in anticipation of performing unsatisfactorily, or even 
marginally.
Further, and more important, the connection between 
investment and growth is almost certainly exaggerated by 
many casual commentators; in particular, the value of stretch 
ing investment a margin further in a given year is easily 
overstated. If markets work (and if they do not, I am unsure 
why you invited an economist to speak to you this evening), 
then the best investments, the ones that make the greatest 
contributions to productivity and growth, are the ones that 
will pass any reasonable market test. The investments that 
could then be teased out of the economy at the margin are the 
ones whose value is, well, marginal. As I argued earlier, a 
good deal of the additional investment stimulated by ACRS 
was apparently in tax shelters. This suggests that we must 
examine critically those casual notions about investment being 
the engine of all progress and growth, and the risks that tax 
reform, being less generous at the margin, will somehow 
reduce our well being.
Benefits of Tax Reform. Criticisms of tax reform on the 
basis of its impact on the tax component of a cost of capital 
formula ignore its other potentially beneficial effects.
As was noted above, the likely outcome of a low-rate 
income tax with neutral, nonsubsidized depreciation is a
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reduction of tax sheltering. This welcome development would 
redirect billions of dollars from socially unproductive invest 
ments in real estate and other tax-favored areas into more 
traditional investment fields. The additional capital would 
offset the effect of the elimination of investment subsidies.
Likewise, a reduction in marginal tax rates for individuals 
has the potential to encourage saving. In all likelihood, the 
increase in saving would be modest, but it would be welcome; 
and it would make more funds available for traditional 
investments. Perhaps even more significant, reduced tax rates 
and cutbacks of deductibility of interest on consumer loans 
(including increases in the zero bracket amount, which reduce 
the number of people who itemize) will decrease borrowing, 
which is negative saving.
The importance of these developments should not be 
ignored. Many business advocates seem to take a tunnel view 
of tax reform and investment, seeing only the repeal of the 
investment credit or of ACRS. What such observers fail to see 
is favorable movements of another element of the cost of 
capital: interest expense. If capital moves from tax shelters 
into traditional investments, and household saving and bor 
rowing shift modestly but favorably, tax changes in the cost of 
capital could be offset by reduced borrowing costs, leaving the 
business sector better off.
Another beneficial effect of tax reform and lower marginal 
tax rates will be a greater incentive to work. Again, changes 
will likely be modest, but favorable. When all of these changes 
occur simultaneously, and all are movements in the right 
direction, there is at least the potential for a favorable 
synergism where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
The Joy of Transition. In most changes of tax laws, the 
transition phase is a source of pain and complexity. In many
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respects, a major tax reform may be no different. But in terms 
of the incentive to invest, the transition may be a major plus.
President Reagan has proposed a tax cut for individuals to 
be financed by a tax increase on corporations. Many of the 
revenue-raising steps under the corporate tax, by their nature, 
grow into their full effect over several years. This is generally 
true of changes in depreciation, which affect only investments 
made after the passage of the law, and so embrace the entire 
capital stock only as the pre-existing capital stock wears out 
over a period of years. (This revenue pattern would not hold 
under the administration's current depreciation proposal 
which, through newfound generosity, in fact loses revenue in 
the long run. This is a source of concern regarding the 
administration's plan.)
Because the revenue gain tends to be less in the early years, 
revenue neutrality requires that certain steps be taken to raise 
revenue in the first years after enactment. One such proposal 
was the administration's windfall recapture tax, which would 
add into taxable income a fraction of accelerated depreciation 
allowances claimed since 1980, and would raise revenue for 
only four years. As was explained above, this provision is 
intended to recover some of the windfall gain to corporations 
who invested in anticipation of paying tax at a 46 percent rate, 
only to be greeted by a tax reform that would impose tax at 
only 33 percent. Whatever its merits, the windfall recapture 
tax has met with extreme hostility, largely on grounds of being 
a retroactive burden. Its chances of enactment are considered 
to be slim.
The obvious alternative to the recapture tax as a purely 
temporary revenue raiser is a phasing in of the corporate tax 
rate reduction. While politically only a second choice to the 
current administration, the corporate rate cut phase-in is an 
economic gold mine. Consider these attributes:
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First, the rate cut phase-in acts as a short-run investment 
incentive. A firm that invests early on can claim its deprecia 
tion deductions against a higher tax rate, making them more 
valuable.
And second, the phase-in concentrates the benefits of the 
ultimate rate reduction on new rather than old capital. In the 
first years of the phase-in, pre-existing capital is subject to a 
relatively high rate of tax, reducing the windfall for which 
some economists criticize tax reform. As the pre-existing 
capital wears out, however, the statutory tax rates are re 
duced, giving the relief to a greater extent to capital purchased 
after the tax reform takes effect. In the long run, the rate 
reduction rains down more than it otherwise would on new 
capital, making tax reform more cost effective in terms of 
stimulating new investment.
Thus, a temporary provision needed to make tax reform 
revenue-neutral over the short run could defuse much of the 
criticism of the entire grand undertaking on grounds of its 
effect on investment.
Summary. Several aspects of tax reform have the potential 
to improve significantly the economic climate in general, and 
that for investment in particular. Observers who view tax 
reform from one particular perspective have a tendency to 
miss this big picture. We should keep the broad view in mind 
when we make our decisions on tax reform.
Conclusion
Over the past few years, in our frequent episodes of tax 
"reform," we have tended to look for tax remedies to too 
many of our problems economic and otherwise. By now, it is 
almost an article of faith to some people that tax policy is the 
most important determinant of business investment. Perhaps
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this is only predictable, because a business lobbyist who can 
wheedle a tax preference from the Congress can deliver to his 
clients risk-free cash flow, while an engineer or designer can 
only give his firm a roll of the dice in the free and competitive 
market.
As difficult as it may be, though, we must question those 
new preconceptions of taxation as the key to our future. After 
all, if tax incentives are so important, how did our nation grow 
so fast before it even had an income tax? Was Christopher 
Columbus really sailing for Washington to make the case for 
an exploration tax credit? Did anyone really argue whether 
the wagon trains were depreciable or not?
As one who has specialized in the economics of taxation, I 
can only report my opinion: that tax policy is crucial to our 
economy now only because it has been stretched beyond all 
reasonable bounds, to interfere in sector after sector. If it were 
drawn back, the economy would thrive in the short run, after 
some transition pains, only because it would be freed from the 
shackles that the current tax law imposes. In the long run, our 
economic prospects would depend on our ingenuity and 
energy. No one can guarantee that those qualities will be 
enough in an ever more competitive world economy, but for 
myself, I would rather rely on our energy and ingenuity than 
on some purported incentive in an incomprehensible tax law.
